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The approach for probabilistic rationale of artificial intelligence systems 
actions is proposed. It is based on an implementation of the proposed 
interconnected ideas 1-7 about system analysis and optimization focused 
on prognostic modeling. The ideas may be applied also by using another 
probabilistic models which supported by software tools and can predict 
successfulness or risks on a level of probability distribution functions.  The 
approach includes description of the proposed probabilistic models, optimi-
zation methods for rationale actions and incremental algorithms for solving 
the problems of  supporting decision-making on the base of monitored  data 
and rationale robot actions in uncertainty conditions. The approach means 
practically a proactive commitment to excellence in uncertainty conditions. 
A suitability of the proposed models and methods is demonstrated by ex-
amples which cover wide applications of artificial intelligence systems.
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1. Introduction 
Different mathematical models and methods are applied in system analysis. System analysis is required at level of the international standards of 
system engineering - for example, ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 
“System and software engineering – System life cycle 
processes”,  ISO 17359 “Condition monitoring and di-
agnostics of machines - General guidelines”,  IEC 61508 
“Functional safety of electrical/ electronic/ programmable 
electronic safety-related systems” etc. It is recommended 
for using every time across all life-cycle to analyze per-
formance, system behaviour, feasibility, affordability, crit-
ical quality characteristics, technical risks, sensitivity for 
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changes of critical parameters values etc. Artificial intel-
ligence systems (AIS) which are understood here as sys-
tems, performing functions by logic reasoning on the base 
of data processing, also needs system analysis because of 
their complexities and uncertainty conditions. 
Note: System is combination of interacting elements or-
ganized to achieve one or more stated purposes (according 
to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288).
Considering AIS specificity there may be some scien-
tific problems devoted to:
(1) system analysis of uncertainty factors, capabilities 
of operation in real time, information gathering and pro-
cessing, protection from  authorized access and dangerous 
influences;
(2) analysis of system requirements to acceptable con-
ditions; 
(3) system analysis and optimization in architectural 
design;
(4) comparative and prognostic estimations  of  quality, 
safety, interaction “user-system” and conditions, optimi-
zation of different processes, rationale of operation in un-
certainty, etc.
Now there isn’t enough universal effective approach 
to rationale of actions for AIS operating in uncertainty 
conditions. In practice for each concrete case it is often 
used subjective expert estimations, a regression analysis 
of collected data, a simulation of processes [1-14]. It means, 
that search of new methods for advanced rationale actions 
of AIS and by AIS is today very important. The proposed 
approach is focused on probabilistic  rationale of actions 
to operate in uncertainty conditions against existing ap-
proaches for which applied mathematical methods cover 
mainly information processing in the logician if …, that 
… and/or tracing situations by a man-operator. An ap-
plication scope of this paper covers AIS supporting de-
cision-making in intellectual manufacture (for example, 
in dispatcher intelligence centers) and robotics systems 
operating in uncertainty conditions and used to provide 
operation efficiency or/and increase reliability and safety 
(including aerial, land, underground, underwater, univer-
sal and functionally focused AIS). 
The main efforts of this paper are not connected with 
illustrating the capabilities of AIS, but they are focused 
on  demonstrating the applicability of original probabilis-
tic models and methods to improve some of the existing 
capabilities of AIS [15-45]. For this goal by the use of these 
probabilistic models the next specific problems are cov-
ered:
(1) the problem 1 - to rationale a rational variant for de-
cision-making on the base of monitored  data about events 
and conditions, and
(2) the problem 2 - to rationale a robot actions under 
limitations on admissible risks of “failures” (according to 
ISO Guide 73 risk is defined as effect of uncertainty on 
objectives considering consequences. An effect is a devia-
tion from the expected — positive and/or negative). 
Note: Some relevant problems (such as the problems of 
robotics orientation, localization and mapping, informa-
tion gathering, the perception and analysis of commands, 
movement and tactile, realizations of manipulations for 
which different probabilistic methods are also applicable) 
have not been covered by this work.  
The proposed approach for solving AIS problems are 
based on theoretical and practical researches  [15-45] and 
need to be used either in combination or in addition to ex-
isting methods which are used now in AIS. There, where it 
is required often prognostic system analysis or where the 
used approaches are not effective, the proposed probabi-
listic approach can be used as rational basis or alternative. 
The ideas of this approach may be applied also by using 
another probabilistic models which supported by software 
tools and can predict success or risks on a level of prob-
ability distribution functions (PDF). The structure of this 
research is shown by the Figure 1.  
Figure 1. The structure of the research
Various fields of the examples applications have been 
chosen purposely to demonstrate universality and analyti-
cal usefulness of the probabilistic approach. The proposed 
models and methods are an original Russian creation, they 
have been presented at seminars, symposiums, confer-
ences, ISO/IEC working groups and other forums since 
2000 in Russia, Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Kuwait,  Luxembourg, Poland, Serbia, 
the USA, etc. The supporting software tools were award-
ed by the Golden Medal of the International Innovation 
and Investment Salon and the International Exhibition 
“Intellectual Robots”, acknowledged on the World's fair 
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of information technologies CeBIT in Germany, noted 
by diplomas of the Hanover Industrial Exhibition and the 
Russian exhibitions of software. 
2. The essence of the approach 
The AIS behaviour corresponding to the rationale of ac-
tions for AIS operating in uncertainty conditions means 
proactive commitment to excellence. Such behaviour is 
based on an implementation of the next proposed inter-
connected ideas 1-7.  
Idea 1 is concerning the usual concept and properties 
of probability distribution functions (PDF) [15] for a con-
tinuous random variable of time. PDF for a time variable 
τ is nondecreasing function P(t) whose value for a given 
point t≥0 can be interpreted as a probability that the value 
of the random variable τ is less or equal to the time value t, 
i.e. P(t)=P(τ≤t). Additionally  P(t)=0 for t<0, and P(t)→1 
for t→∞. In general case the solutions for the problems 1 
and 2  are based on using concept of the probabilities of 
“success” and/or “unsuccess” (risk of “failure”) during 
the given prognostic time period treq.. This probability is a 
value for a point treq. and is defined by created PDF.
Idea 2. The processes, connected with data processing, 
and used information should provide required AIS oper-
ation quality (because AIS is a system, performing func-
tions by logic reasoning on the base of data processing). 
And corresponding probabilistic methods should appro-
priate for prognostic estimations.  
Idea 3. The PDF should be presented as analytical de-
pendence on input parameters. It needs to solve direct and 
inverse problems to rationale of actions  in a real time of 
AIS operation. For example, for a simple element PDF 
P(t)  of time τ between  losses of element integrity may be 
presented by analytical exponential approximation, i.e. 
P(t) = 1-exp(-λt), where λ is frequency of failures (losses 
of element integrity).  At the same time frequency of fail-
ures may be represented as a sum of frequencies of fail-
ures because of specific reasons for each failure type – for 
example, failure from “human factor” λ1, from hardware 
λ2, from software λ3 and so on.  For this use case PDF may 
be presented as P(t) =1-exp[-(λ1+λ2+λ3+…)t]. Then if the 
adequate function P(t) is built in dependence on different 
parameters and if admissible level for probability is given 
than inverse problem may be solved. 
Note. The rationale for exponential approximation 
choice in practice see, for example, in [28, 30].        
Idea 4. The PDF should be adequate, it means a de-
pendence on several essential parameters which define 
AIS operation  and on which “success” or “failure” of 
AIS operation is mainly dependent. For example the way 
for risks prediction based on uses only one parameter - 
frequency of failures λ - is popular today. This implies 
the use of corresponding exponential PDF – see Figure 2. 
Only one connection of the frequency of failures λ with 
random  time variable τ between  losses of system  integrity 
may be interpreted as the requirement: “to provide no fail-
ures during required time with probability no less than the 
given admissible probability Padm. this required time should 
be no more than treq. = 1/ λadm.,  here λadm.=-ln(1-Radm.)”.  But 
for AIS element it is rough and unpromising engineering 
estimations because capabilities of monitoring conditions 
and recovery of the lost element integrity are ignored. 
Such disregard deforms very essentially probabilistic es-
timations of probabilistic risk values and can’t be useful 
for scientific search of effective counteraction measures 
against different threats. Deviations from more adequate 
PDF estimations are very high [33,44,45]. On Figure 3 the 
limitations to admissible risks, fragment of exponential 
and an adequate PDF of time between  losses of system 
integrity with identical frequency of system integrity 
losses are illustrated (in conditional units). It means more 
adequate PDF allows more right understanding of prob-
abilistic AIS vision of events prediction with scientific 
interpretation considering situations in time line. 
Note: System integrity is defined as such system state 
when system purposes are achieved with the required 
quality. 
Figure 2. The possible variants of correlations for ad-
missible risks, exponential and an adequate PDF of time 
between  losses of system integrity with identical frequen-
cy of losses
Figure 3. All requirements to admissible risk are met for 
an adequate PDF of time between  losses of system integ-
rity
Idea 5. Because an AIS is a complex system and this 
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AIS may be subsystem or element of comprehensive 
complex system,  the proposed approach should allow 
a generation of probabilistic models for prediction of 
“success” or “failure” of AIS actions in uncertainty con-
ditions. In general case an input for generated models 
used in real time should consider system complexity, 
periodical diagnostics, monitoring between diagnostics, 
recovery of the lost integrity for every system element 
and also processes, connected with data processing, and 
used information. As an output of such generated models 
adequate PDF of time τ between  losses of system (sub-
system, element) integrity should be produced in analyti-
cal form. 
Idea 6. Input for probabilistic modeling should be 
formed mainly from gathered data and established specific 
order of AIS actions. 
Idea 7. To probabilistic rationale of actions for AIS 
operating in uncertainty conditions the problems of opti-
mization should be solved. Optimization should be per-
formed in real time by defined beforehand  optimization 
problem statement. Every time the used optimization 
problem statement  should be appropriated for solving 
specific problem 1or 2. For probabilistic rationale of 
actions the prognostic period should be defined so to be 
in time to do the given action or complex of actions on 
acceptable level according to optimization criterion or to 
perform preventive action (with which the initiation of 
performing an action or solving a problem is connected) 
or/and to recover operation capabilities (which can be 
lost). 
For the approach implementation the next probabilistic 
models are proposed.  
3. The Description of the Proposed Models 
In general case a probabilistic space (Ω, B, P) for probabi-
listic modeling is created [15], where: Ω - is a limited space 
of elementary events; B – a class of all subspace of Ω-space, 
satisfied to the properties of σ-algebra; P – is a probabil-
ity measure on a space of elementary events Ω. Because, 
Ω={ωk} is limited, there is enough to establish a reflection 
ωk→pk =P(ωk) like that pk ≥ 0  and 1=∑
k
kp . 
In order not to overload the reader with mathematical 
details, the final formulas for calculations are presented in 
the Appendixes A and B. 
3.1 About AIS operation quality 
The proposed models help to implement ideas 1 and 2.
In general case AIS operation quality is connected with 
requirements for reliable and  timely producing complete, 
valid and/or, if needed, confidential information. The gath-
ered information  is used for proper AIS specificity. The 
abstract view on a quality of used information is presented 
on Figure 4.
Figure 4. Abstract explanation for a quality of used (real) 
information against required one
The proposed models for the estimation of information 
systems operation quality are described  in Table A.1 of 
Appendix.
The main analytical models and calculated  measures 
are the next:
(1) “The model of functions performance by a complex 
system in conditions of unreliability of its components”;
(2) “The models complex of calls processing”;
(3) “The model of entering into IS current data con-
cerning new objects of application domain”;
(4) “The model of information gathering”;
(5) “The model of information analysis”;
(6) “The models complex of dangerous influences on a 
protected system”;
(7) “The models complex of an authorized access to 
system resources”.
Risk to lose integrity (R) is an addition to 1 for prob-
ability of “success” (P), i.e.  R=1-P considering conse-
quences.
These models, supported by different versions of soft-
ware Complex for Evaluation of Information Systems Op-
eration Quality, registered by Rospatent №2000610272 [46], 
may be applied and  improved for solving problems 1 and 
2.
3.2 About Risks Prediction for System Formalized 
as “Black box” 
The proposed models helps to implement ideas 1, 3, 4.
In general case successful system  operation (not only 
AIS)  is connected with system counteraction against var-
ious dangerous influences on system integrity - these may 
be counteractions against failures, defects events, “human 
factors” events, etc. There are proposed the formalization 
for two general technologies of providing counteraction 
against threats: periodical diagnostics of system integrity 
(technology 1, without monitoring between diagnostics) 
and additionally monitoring between diagnostics (technol-
ogy 2). As a rule these technologies are implemented by 
AIS.  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/aia.v1i2.1195
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Technology 1 is based on periodical diagnostics of 
system integrity, that is carried out to detect danger 
sources penetration into a system or consequences of 
negative influences (see Figure 5). The lost system in-
tegrity can be detect only as a result of diagnostics, after 
which system recovery is started.  Dangerous influence 
on system is acted step-by step: at first a danger source 
penetrates into a system and then after its activation 
begins to influence.  System integrity can’t be lost be-
fore a penetrated danger source is activated. A danger is 
considered to be realized only after a danger source has 
influenced on a system. 
Figure 5. Some accident events for technology 1 (left – 
correct operation, right – a lose of integrity during prog-
nostic period Treq. )
Technology 2, unlike the previous one, implies that 
system integrity is traced between diagnostics by operator 
(operator functions may be performed by a man or special 
AIS component or their combination). In case of detecting 
a danger source an operator recovers system integrity. The 
ways of integrity recovering are analogous to the ways of 
technology 1 – see Figure 6.  
Figure 6. Some accident events for technology 2 (left – 
correct operation, right – a lose of integrity during prog-
nostic period Treq. )
Faultless operator’s actions provide a neutralization of 
a danger source trying to penetrate into a system. A pen-
etration of a danger source is possible only if an operator 
makes an error but a dangerous influence occurs if the 
danger is activated before the next diagnostic. Otherwise 
the source will be detected and neutralized during the next 
diagnostic.  
It is supposed for technologies 1 and 2 that the used di-
agnostic tools allow to provide necessary system integrity 
recovery after revealing danger sources penetration into a 
system or consequences of  influences.
The probability of correct  system operation within the 
given prognostic period (i.e. probability of “success” - P) 
may be estimated as a result of use the models presented 
in Appendix B.  Risk to lose integrity (R) is an addition 
to 1 for probability of correct  system operation (P), i.e. 
R=1-P considering consequences.
3.3 About a Generation of Probabilistic Models 
for Complex System 
The proposed method for a generation of probabilistic 
models helps to implement ideas 1 and 5.
The basic ideas of correct integration of probability 
metrics are based on a combination and development of 
models.  For a complex systems with parallel or serial 
structure described there are proposed the next method 
to generate adequate probabilistic models [25,26,28-30]. This 
method uses the usual way of probability theory for 
independent random variables. However, given the im-
portance to rationale the generation of new probabilistic 
models for complex system, the approach is described 
below.
Let’s consider the elementary structure from two in-
dependent parallel or series elements. Let’s PDF of time 
between  losses of i-th element integrity is Вi(t) =Р (τi≤ t), 
then: 
(1) time between  losses of integrity for system com-
bined from series connected independent elements is 
equal to a minimum from two times τi: failure of 1st or 
2nd elements (i.e. the system goes into a state of lost in-
tegrity when either 1st, or 2nd element integrity is lost). 
For this case the PDF of time between  losses of system 
integrity is defined by expression
В(t) = Р[min (τ1,τ2)≤t]=1- Р[min (τ1,τ2)>t]=1-Р(τ1>t)Р(τ2 > 
t)= 1 – [1-В1(t)] [1- В2(t)] (1)
(2) time between losses of integrity for system com-
bined from parallel connected independent elements (hot 
reservation) is equal to a maximum from two times τi: 
failure of 1st and 2nd elements (i.e. the system goes into 
a state of lost integrity when both 1st and 2nd elements 
have lost integrity).  For this case the PDF of time be-
tween  losses of system integrity is defined by expression 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/aia.v1i2.1195
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В(t)=Р[max(τ1,τ2)≤t]=Р(τ1≤t)Р(τ2≤t)=В1(t)В2(t) (2)
Applying recurrently expressions (1) – (2), it is possi-
ble to build PDF of time between  losses of integrity for 
any complex system with parallel and/or series structure 
and theirs combinations.
An example of complex system integrating two serial 
complex subsystems (abstraction) is presented by Figure 7. 
For this integration the next interpretation of elementary 
events is used:  complex system integrating compound 
components “Intellectual tructure 1 and 2” is in condition 
“correct operation” (“success”) during given period Treq. if 
during this period “AND” component “Intellectual truc-
ture 1”  “AND” component “Intellectual tructure 2” (both 
are special complex subsystems including AIS subsystems 
and elements) are in condition “correct operation” (“suc-
cess”).  
All ideas for analytical modeling complex systems are 
supported by the software tools “Mathematical modeling 
of system life cycle processes” – “know how” (registered 
by Rospatent №2004610858), “Complex for evaluating 
quality of production processes” (registered by Rospatent 
№2010614145) and others [46-51]. 
Figure 7. An example of complex system integrating two 
serial complex intellectual structures which also are com-
plex subsystems (abstraction)
3.4 About Data Forming for Probabilistic Model-
ing
The proposed practical way to data forming helps to im-
plement idea 6.  
For each critical parameter (for which prognostic esti-
mations are needed to do actions) the ranges of acceptable 
conditions can be established. The traced conditions of 
monitored parameters are data about a condition before 
and on the current moment of time. For example, the rang-
es of possible values of conditions may be established: 
“Working range inside of norm”, “Out of working range, 
but inside of norm”, “Abnormality” for each separate crit-
ical parameter. If the  parameter ranges of acceptable con-
ditions are not established in explicit form than for mod-
eling purpose the may be implead and can be expressed 
in the form of average time value. These time values are 
used as input for probabilistic modeling. For example, for 
coal mine some of many dozens heterogeneous parameters 
are: for ventilation equipment - temperature of rotor and 
engine bearings, a current on phases and voltage of stator; 
for modular decontamination equipment - vacuum in the 
pipeline, the expense and temperature of a metano-air 
mix in the pipeline before equipment, pressure in system 
of compressed air, etc. It may be interpreted similarly by 
light signals – “green”, “yellow”, “red” - see Figure 8 and 
following Example 6.3.
Figure 8. An example of universal elementary ranges for 
monitoring data about events and conditions
4. Optimization Problem Statements for Ra-
tionale Actions 
The proposed optimization problem statements for ratio-
nale actions helps to implement idea 7. For example the 
proposed ideas 2-6 may be supported by the next typical 
optimization problem statements for AIS [25,28,30]:
(1) on the stages of system concept, development, pro-
duction and support: system parameters, software, tech-
nical and control measures (Q) are the most rational for 
the given prognostic period if on them the minimum of 
expenses (Zdev.) for creation is reached
Zdev. (Q rational) = min Z dev. (Q),
          Q
(1A) at limitations on probability of an admissible level 
of quality Pquality (Q) ≥  Padm.  and expenses for operation 
Сoper. (Q) ≤ С adm.  and under other development, operation 
or maintenance conditions; or
(1B) at limitations on admissible risk to lose system 
integrity  R≤Radm. and expenses for operation Сoper.  (Q) ≤ 
С adm.  and under other development, operation or mainte-
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/aia.v1i2.1195
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nance conditions; or
(1C) at limitations presented as combination 1A) and 
1B);
(2) on utilization stage: 
(A) system parameters, software, technical and control 
measures (Q) are the most rational for the given period of 
AIS operation if on them the maximum of probability of 
correct system operation is reached
Pquality (Q rational) = max Pquality (Q),
           Q
(2A.a) at limitations on probability of an admissible 
level of quality Pquality (Q) ≥  Padm.  and expenses for opera-
tion Сoper. (Q) ≤С adm.  and under other operation or mainte-
nance conditions; or
(2A.b). at limitations on admissible risk to lose system 
integrity  R≤Radm. and expenses for operation Сoper. (Q) ≤С 
adm.  and under other operation or maintenance conditions; 
or
(2A.c). at limitations presented as combination 2A.a) 
and 2A.b);
(B) system parameters, software, technical and control 
measures (Q) are the most rational for the given period of 
system operation if on them the minimum of risk to lose 
system integrity  is reached
R (Q rational) = min R(Q),
           Q
(2B.a) at limitations on probability of an admissible 
level of quality Pquality (Q) ≥  Padm.  and expenses for opera-
tion Сoper. (Q) ≤С adm.  and under other operation or mainte-
nance conditions; or
(2B.b) at limitations on admissible risk to lose system 
integrity  R≤Radm. and expenses for operation Сoper. (Q) ≤С 
adm.  and under other operation or maintenance conditions; 
or
(2B.c). at limitations presented as combination 2A.a) 
and 2A.b);
These statements may be transformed into the problems 
of expenses minimization in different limitations.  There 
may be combination of these formal statements in system 
life cycle.
Note. Another variants of optimization problem state-
ments are possible. 
5. The incremental algorithms for solving the 
problems 1 and 2 
The proposed algorithms for solving the problems 1 and 2 
are based on using the models and methods above.
5.1 The Algorithm for Solving  Problem to Ratio-
nale a Rational Variant for Decision-making on 
the Base of Monitored  Data About Events and 
Conditions (problem 1) 
It is supposed that the terms “success” and accordingly 
“unsuccess” (“failure”) are defined in terms of admissible 
condition of interested system to operate for the purpose 
according to required quality. 
Note: For example for each parameter of equipment 
the ranges of possible values of conditions may be esti-
mated as “Working range inside of norm” and “Out of 
working range, but inside of norm” (“success”) or “Ab-
normality” (“failure”), interpreted similarly light signals 
– “green”, “yellow”, “red”. For this definition a “ailure” 
of equipment operation  characterizes a threat to lose 
system norm integrity after danger influence (on the logic 
level this range “Abnormality” may be interpreted analyt-
ically as failure, fault, losses of quality or safety etc.). 
The proposed steps for solving problem 1 to rationale a 
rational variant for decision-making on the base of moni-
tored  data about events and conditions may be carried out 
by the next 4 steps – see Figure 9.
Figure 9. Steps for solving problem 1
Step 1. The complete set of variants for actions is 
defined, including for each variant – a definition of com-
pound components is being. Each use case may be charac-
terized by an expected benefit in comparable conventional 
units.  If the objective value of a benefit can’t be defined, 
expert value of a level of “success” may be established, 
for example, on a dimensionless scale from 0 to 100 (0 – 
«no benefit», i.e. “failure”, 100 – «the maximal benefit », 
i.e. complete “success”).  
Step 2. The measures and optimization criteria are cho-
sen (see sections 3 and 4). As criteria there can be accept-
ed: 
(1) maximum of benefit as a result of system operation 
under the given conditions and limitations on the accept-
able risk of “failure” and/or other limitations;  
(2) maximum probability of “success” or minimum risk 
of “failure” under limitations.
Step 3. The knowledge is used to refine the input for 
modeling. Using the probabilistic models and methods for 
each variant, the “success” measures are calculated for the 
given prognostic period. From a set of possible variants 
the optimal one is chosen according to the step 2 criterion.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/aia.v1i2.1195
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Note: Formal statements of optimization may be con-
nected with maximization of benefit at limitations on 
admissible levels of quality and/or risks measures or with 
minimization of risks at limitations on admissible levels of 
benefit and/or quality and/or risks measures and/or under 
other operation or maintenance conditions (see section 4). 
Step 4. A decision for  the optimal variant of actions 
(defined in step 3) is made. In support of the efficiency of 
the functions, the achievable benefit calculated at step 3 is 
recorded. New knowledge is improved and systematized 
by comparing it with reality (including comparisons of 
probabilistic estimations and real events). 
Note: A solution that meets all conditions may be not 
existing. In this case, there is no optimal variant of system 
operation on the base of monitored  data about  events 
and conditions.
5.2 The Algorithm for Solving  Problem to Ratio-
nale a Robot Actions under Limitations on Ad-
missible Risks of “Failures” (problem 2) 
The approach for solving  problem 2 to rationale a robot 
actions under limitations on admissible risks of “failures” 
is demonstrated in application to robot route optimization 
in conditions of uncertainties.
For a robot, the concept of “failure” under uncertainty 
is defined as the failure to achieve the goal within a given 
time. It is assumed that there are several possible routes to 
achieve the goal, and uncertainties may include both the 
conditions for robot operation (including random events in 
orientation, localization and mapping). The minimum risk 
of “failure”  under the existing conditions and limitations 
is set as a criterion of optimization.
The proposed steps for solving problem 2 of robot 
route optimization under limitations on admissible risks 
of “failure”  under conditions of uncertainties may be car-
ried out by the next 4 steps – see Figure 10. 
Figure 10. Steps for cognitive solving problem 2
Step 1. The complete set of route variants to achieve 
the goal within the given time, and for each variant – a set 
of components, is defined (redefined). Data characterizing 
every part of route for each of the variants are gathered 
(refined) for modeling. To do this, a specific robot can 
use data from various sources (for example, from air 
drones, intelligent buoys on the water or sensors under 
water, etc.). If necessary, possible damages are taken into 
account. For example, each use case may be character-
ized by an expected damages in comparable conventional 
units.  If the objective value of a damage can’t be defined, 
expert value of expected level of “failure” for each variant 
may be set, for example, on a dimensionless scale from 0 
to 100 (0 – «no damages», i.e. “success”, 100 – «the max-
imal damage»). 
The index i of the first part of the selected route is set 
to the initial value i=1.
Step 2. The knowledge is used to refine the input for 
prognostic modeling. Using probabilistic model, a cal-
culation of the probability of “failure”  (risk of “failure”) 
is carried out for each variant. From the set of variants 
(remaining route) the optimal one is chosen, for its the 
minimum probability of “failure” (risk of “failure”) is 
achieved.
Step 3. The robot overcomes the i-th part of the select-
ed route. If the part can’t be overcome, the comeback to 
the initial point of the part is being. If an alternative route 
isn’t here, the comeback to initial point of the previous 
part is being. The input for modeling every part of possi-
ble route for each of the variants are updated. New knowl-
edge is improved and systematized by comparing it with 
reality (including comparisons of prognostic risks and real 
events). 
Step 4. If, after overcoming the i-th part, the robot 
arrived at the intended point of route (i.e., the last part 
of the route is overcome and the goal is achieved), then 
the solution for optimizing the route is complete. If the 
robot hasn’t yet arrived at the intended point (i.e. the last 
part of the route isn’t overcome), then the complete set of 
different route variants for achieving the goal is redefined 
(similar to step 1). The input for modeling every part of 
possible route for each of the variants are updated, i= i+1. 
Then steps 2-4 are repeated until the last part of the route 
is overcome on the set of possible variants (i.e. it means 
the goal is achieved and problem 2 is solved).
If the set of possible options is exhausted and the goal 
is not achieved, it is concluded that the goal is unattain-
able with the risk of “failure” less than the acceptable risk 
(i.e., it means an impossibility of solving problem 2 in the 
defined conditions).
Thus, to rationale a robot actions under limitations on 
admissible risks of “failures” (i.e. to a “successful” solu-
tion of problem 2) in real time, information gathering, 
probabilistic predictions for possible route variants, their 
comparison, the choice of the best variant, the implemen-
tation of further actions, the improvement, systematization 
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and use of knowledge are being.
6. Examples 
6.1 About a Period of Successful System Opera-
tion by AIS Capabilities 
The example is related partly to solving the problem 1 
and concerning an estimation of successful system opera-
tion during a long time by AIS capabilities in comparison 
against an usual system without or with usual sensors 
(without artificial intelligence capabilities to logic reason-
ing). 
How long time may be a period of successful system 
operation by AIS capabilities? And what about conditions 
for this long period?   
Those threats to system operation which are known, 
traced at diagnostics and do not cause irreversible con-
sequences at the first influence, are considered only.  Be-
sides, it is supposed, that an integrity can be operatively 
recovered after AIS recovering reaction at the earliest 
stages of detection of dangerous or guarding symptoms. 
Moreover, at modeling the time of full integrity recover-
ing is artificially reduced till diagnostic time. Thus, the 
elementary condition “acceptable integrity” means such 
system state when system purposes are achieved with 
the required quality, i.e. absence of  danger source or 
neutralization of a penetrated source at the earliest stage 
prior to the its danger influence after activation. It (as 
supposed by the model) enough for successful AIS oper-
ation.
Note: The above assumptions are supposed for model-
ing. In a reality it may be not always so. These conditions 
are considered for interpretation of modeling results. 
To compare system operation with AIS capabilities 
against an usual system (without artificial intelligence 
capabilities) for the same conditions we consider AIS pos-
sibilities to provide “acceptable integrity” by continuous 
monitoring with artificial intelligence logic reasoning. 
Let's the threats to system  integrity are being about 1 
time a day because of natural or  technogenic  threats and 
“human factor”. Let's  also after occurrence of a danger 
source an average activation time is equal to 6 hours, 
during which else it is possible to prevent or neutralize 
negative influence.  
Two variants of reaction caring of AIS integrity are 
compared. 1st variant (an usual system) considers the 
address to a recovering center about 1 time a month and 
reception of necessary recovering procedures within 4 
hours after diagnostics. 2nd  variant  means AIS perform-
ing functions of diagnostics every 4 hours and recovering 
acceptable integrity within one hour. For all variants mean 
time between operator’s error during continuous monitor-
ing of system integrity is estimated not less than 1 year (for 
general technology 2). Initial input data for probabilistic 
modeling are reflected by the Table 1, the used model is 
described in subsection 3.2 of this paper.  
Table 1. Input for estimation
Input for modeling
Variants for comparisons
1-st (an usual system) 2-nd (an AIS)
The given  prognostic period (“in 
future”) 3 years 5 years
The frequency of influences for 
penetrating into system 1 day
-1 1 day-1
The mean activation time 6 hours 6 hours
The time between the end of 
diagnostic and the beginning of 
the next diagnostic
1 month
4 hours (by 
AIS capabili-
ties)
The diagnostic time 4 hours 1 hour (by AIS capabilities)
The mean time between oper-
ator’s error during continuous 
monitoring of system integrity
1 year 1 year
Some probabilities of providing system integrity in 
dependence on input, changing in diapason -50%+100% 
from Table 1 data, are presented on Figures 11-139. They 
cover dependences on  the given  prognostic period, the 
time between the end of diagnostic and the beginning of 
the next diagnostic, the mean time between operator’s er-
ror during continuous monitoring of integrity. Deviations 
for other dependences are insignificant. 
Figure 11. The probability of providing system integrity 
in dependence on the given prognostic period
Figure 12. The probability of providing system integrity 
in dependence on the time between the end of diagnostics 
and the beginning of the next diagnostics
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Figure 13. The probability of providing system integrity 
in dependence on the mean time between operator’s errors 
during continuous monitoring of system integrity
Results of modeling show, that for 1st variant (for an 
usual system) the probability to provide “acceptable in-
tegrity” during 1 year is equal to 0.39, during 2 years – 
not less than 0.16, during 3 years – only 0.07. It means 
practically the inevitability of a failure during 2-3 years. 
2nd variant (for AIS) with operative recovering is more 
effective. Really, it is possible to provide “acceptable in-
tegrity” for system operation with AIS capabilities within 
3-5 years with probability about 0.90-0.93 – it may be in-
terpreted as successful operation 9 times from 10 possible 
five-year periods. These results of modelling should serve 
a rationale for development counteractions against threats. 
Conditions for five-year period of  successful system op-
eration with AIS capabilities are presented in Table 1 for 
2nd variant.
Note. Serrated and nonmonotonic character of depen-
dence on Figures 11, 12 (left) is explained by the periodic 
diagnostics, monitoring presence or absence and their 
quantitative values, and also because of parameter “N” is 
integer part – see Appendix B.  Detais see in [30].
Of course the concepts “acceptable integrity” and “fail-
ure” of special system should be defined in details (which 
produced input for modeling). However the expected 
modeling results against typical plausible input for this 
this simple example  has also demonstrated for readers a 
suitability of the proposed probabilistic “Black box” mod-
els (from section 3).  
6.2 Example 2 of Acceptable Requirements to 
Solve Problem 1 for Information Systems Opera-
tion 
The example is connected with rationale a rational re-
quirements to information system (IS) operation for pro-
viding high information quality for using in an AIS. Infor-
mation systems are systems for which input is information 
and output (as result of IS operation) also is information 
for following use according to purpose. This example 
summarizes the numerous results of researches performed 
for IS operating in government agencies, manufacturing 
structures (including power generation, coal enterprises, 
oil-and-gas systems), emergency services etc. [20,25,28,30-33,35-
45]. The results are based on described modeling to provide 
quality of output information producing, quality of used 
information  IS and security of IS operation (see Table A.1 
from Appendix A).
According to this generalization for the best practice of 
IS operation the acceptable requirements are the next (see 
the measures from Table 1):
(1) to provide quality of output information producing:  
A. Probability of providing reliable function perfor-
mance during given time should be no less than 0.99;
B. System availability should be no less than 0.9995;
C. Probability of well-timed calls processing during the 
required term should be no less than 0.95;
D. Relative portion of well-timed processed calls of 
those types for which the customer requirements are met 
should be no less than 95%;
(2) to provide quality of used information:
A. Probability that system contains information about 
states of all real object and coincides should be no less 
than 0.9;
B. Probability of information actuality on the moment 
of its use should be no less than 0.9;
C. Probability of errors absence after checking should 
be no less than 0.97;
D. Probability of correct analysis results obtaining 
should be no less than 0.95;
E. Probability of providing information confidentiality 
during objective period should be no less than 0.999;
(3) to provide security of IS operation:
A. Probability of faultless (correct) operation under 
dangerous influence on IS during given time should be no 
less than 0.95;
B. Probability of system protection against unautho-
rized access should be no less than 0.99.
These values characterizes some admissible limitations 
for probabilities of “success” (P) and risks of “unsuccess” 
(R=1-P) for information systems operation quality.
The fulfillment of these requirements is a certain sci-
entifically proved guarantee of the quality of information 
used by AIS.
6.3 Example of Solving Inverse Problem to Es-
timate the Mean Residual Time before the Next 
Parameters Abnormalities for a Coal Company
The example demonstrates an AIS possibility on the base 
of solving inverse problem by model described in subsec-
tion 3.2 and Appendix B to a rationale of actions  in a real 
time for a coal company 
Conditions of parameters, traced by dispatcher intelli-
gence center, are data about a condition before and on the 
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current moment of time, but always the future is more im-
portant for all. With use of current data responsible staff 
(mechanics, technologists, engineers, etc.) should know 
about admissible time for work performance to maintain 
system operation. Otherwise because of ignorance of a 
residual time resource before abnormality the necessary 
works are not carried out. I.e. because of ignorance of this 
residual time it is not undertaken measures for prevention 
of negative events after parameters abnormalities (failures, 
accidents, damages and-or the missed benefit because of 
equipment time out). And on the contrary, knowing resid-
ual time before abnormality these events may be avoided, 
or system may be maintained accordingly. For monitored 
critical system the probabilistic approach to estimate the 
mean residual time before the next parameters abnormali-
ties for each element and whole system is proposed.
For every valuable subsystem (element) monitored pa-
rameters are chosen, and for each parameter the ranges of 
possible values of conditions are established: “In working 
limits”, “Out of working range, but inside of norm”), “Ab-
normality” (interpreted similarly light signals – “green”, 
“yellow”, “red”) – see Figures 8 and 14. The condition 
“Abnormality” characterizes a threat to lose system integ-
rity. 
Figure 14. Example of a prognozed residual time before 
the next parameter abnormality
For avoiding the possible crossing a border of “Abnor-
mality” a prediction of residual time, which is available 
for preventive measures, according to gathered data about 
parameter condition fluctuations considering ranges is car-
ried out. The approach allow to estimate residual time be-
fore the next parameter abnormality (i.e. time before first 
next coming into “red” range) [35]. The estimated residual 
time Tresid is the solution t0 of equation:
R(Tpenetr, t, Tbetw, Tdiag, Treq.) = Radm.(Treq) (3)
concerning of  unknown  parameter t, i.e. Tresid = t0.
Here R(Tpenetr, t, Tbetw, Tdiag, Treq.) is risk  to lose integ-
rity, it is addition to 1 for probability P(Treq) of providing 
system integrity (“probability of success”), for calcula-
tions the formulas (B.1)–(B.3). Tpenetr is the mathematical 
expectation of PDF Ωpenetr (τ), it is defined by parameter 
statistics of transition from “green” into “yellow” range 
(see Figure 8). The others parameters Tbetw, Tdiag  in (3) are 
known – see Appendix B. The main practical questions 
are: what about Treq. and  what about a given admissible 
risk Radm.(Treq)? For answering we can use the properties of 
function R(Tpenetr, t, Tbetw, Tdiag, Treq.):
(1) if parameter  t increases from 0 to ∞ for the same 
another parameters, the function R(…, t, …)  is monoto-
nously decreasing from 1 to 0 (for N – real, i.e. no integer 
part), if the mean activation time of occurred danger (threat 
- from the 1-st input at the “yellow” range to the 1-st input 
in the “red” range) is bigger to lose integrity is less;
(2) if parameter Treq increases from 0 to ∞ for the same 
another parameters, the function R(…,Treq)  is monoto-
nously increasing from 0 to 1, i.e. for large  Treq  risk ap-
proaches to 1.
It means the such maximal x exists when t=x and 
Treq.=x and  0<R(Tpenetr, x, Tbetw, Tdiag, x)<1.  I.e. the residual 
time before the next parameter abnormality (i.e. time be-
fore first next coming into “red” range) is equal to defined 
x with confidence level of admissible risk R(Tpenetr, x, Tbetw, 
Tdiag, x). So, if Tpenetr =100 days, for Radm.= 0.01 residual 
time x≈2.96 weeks (considering decisions of recovery 
problems of integrity every 8 hours). Adequate reaction of 
responsible staff in real time is transparent for all interest-
ed parties. Details see [35].
6.4 Example of Solving Problem 1 by AIS Oper-
ating for  Providing Safety of a Floating Oil and 
Gas Platform 
For estimation and rationale the possibilities of a floating 
oil and gas platform operation (considered as a system) 
the probabilistic modeling is being to answer the next 
question: “What risks to lose system integrity may be for 
a year, 10 and 20 years if some subsystems are supported 
by special AIS on the levels which are proper to skilled 
workers (optimistic view) and to medium-level workers 
(realistic view)?” 
Let for studying efficiency a system  is decomposed on 
9 subsystems, for example - see Figure 15. System com-
ponents are: 1st - a construction of platform; 2nd - an AIS 
on platform for robotics monitoring and control; 3rd - an 
underwater communication modem; 4th - a remote con-
trolled unmanned underwater robotic vehicle; 5th - a sonar 
beacon; 6th - an autonomous unmanned underwater ro-
botic vehicle; 7th - non-boarding robotic boat - a spray of 
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the sorbent; 8th - non-boarding robotic boat – a pollution 
collector; 9th - an unmanned aerial vehicle. Data is moni-
tored  from different sources and processed by the models 
described above in section 3. 
Note: Of course every subsystem also may be consid-
ered as a special complex system. 
 
Figure 15. Subsystems operating for  providing safety of 
a floating oil and gas platform
The information from monitored data and a time data 
of enterprises procedures are used as input for using 
models from Table A.2 and performing steps 1-4 (from 
Figure 9) in real time. Here risks to lose system integrity 
during given period Tgiven means risks to be at least once 
in state “Abnormality” within Treq.. The functions of mod-
eling may be performed on special servers (centralized or 
mapped). If virtual risks are computed for all points Treq. 
from 0 to ∞, the calculated values form a trajectory of the 
PDF. The mathematical expectation of this PDF means 
the mean residual time to the next state “Abnormality”. It 
defines mean time before failures (MTBF) from this PDF. 
Requirements to IS operation quality should meet admis-
sible levels recommended in Example 2.   
To answer the question of the example let the next in-
put are formed from data monitored and the time data of 
enterprises procedures.
Let for every system component a frequency of occur-
rence of the latent or obvious threats is equal to once a 
month, mean activation time of threats is about 1 day. The 
system diagnostics are used once for work shift 8 hours, a 
mean duration of the system control is about 10 minutes, 
mean recovery time of the lost integrity of object equals 
to 1 day. The workers (they may be robotics, skilled  me-
chanics, technologists, engineers etc.) are supported by 
capabilities of an intellectual system allowing estimations 
in real time the mean residual time before the next pa-
rameters abnormalities. Formally they operate as parallel 
elements with hot reservation. Workers are capable to 
revealing  signs of a critical situation after their occur-
rence owing to the support of intellectual systems. If all 
subsystems are supported by intellectual systems on the 
level which is proper to skilled workers (optimistic view), 
workers can commit errors on the average not more often 
once a year. If all subsystems are supported by intellec-
tual system on the level which is proper to medium-level 
workers (realistic view) only one difference is – medi-
um-level workers can commit errors more often in com-
parison with skilled workers, for one element it is equal to 
1 time a month instead of once a year.
Further we do the steps 1-4 from Figure 9.  Computed 
risks to lose system integrity on Figure 15 means the risks 
of “failure” for every subsystem which can be detailed 
to the level of every separate critical parameter of equip-
ment. 
The fragments of built PDFs on Figure 15 show: 
(1) if all subsystems are supported by intellectual sys-
tem on the level which is proper to skilled workers (opti-
mistic view) the risk of “failure” increases from 0.000003 
for a year to 0.0004 for 10 years and to 0.0013 for 20 
years. The MTBF equals to 283 years;
(2) if all subsystems are supported by intellectual sys-
tem on the level which is proper to medium-level workers 
(realistic view) the risk of “failure” increases from 0.0009 
for a year to 0.0844 for 10 years and 0.25 for 20 years. 
The MTBF equals to 24 years. It is 11.4 times less against 
the results for optimistic view.  
Such effects (MTBF = 283 years for optimistic view 
and  MTBF = 24 years for realistic view) are owing to 
implemented technology of counteractions to threats. 
These are some estimations for example assumptions. 
Please, compare the effects against primary frequency of 
occurrence of the latent or obvious threats is equal to once 
a month, mean activation time of threats is about 1 day + 
workers errors.  
6.5 Example of Solving Problem 2 for a Robot 
Route Optimization
Applicability of the proposed probabilistic methods and 
models to solving problem 2 (of robot actions optimiza-
tion under limitations on admissible risks of “failure”) is 
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demonstrated to improve some of the existing capabilities 
of a rescue robot, interconnected with accessory drone, 
for route optimization in conditions of uncertainties. Sim-
ilar problems of specific rescue robot route optimization 
from point A (Start) to point E (End) can arise in burning 
wood, in mountains, in the conditions of a city, and in 
other situations in conditions of uncertainties. Specific 
cases of uncertainties can be connected additionally with 
complex conditions of environment and necessity of ro-
botics orientation, localization and mapping that influenc-
es on input for the proposed probabilistic models. 
On this simplified hypothetical example of moving 
some rented values by means of the pilotless car from 
point A to the final point E of a route (from where the SOS 
signals are  following) we will demonstrate the proposed 
approach to route optimization with acceptable risk of 
“failure”  less than 0.1 (i.e. a probability of success should 
be more than 0.9) under conditions of uncertainties during 
the route – see Figure 16.
Figure 16. Possible robot route from point A (Start) to 
point E (End)
The next steps from Figure 10 are performed. 
Step 1. The complete set of route variants to achieve 
the goal within given 2 hours, and for each variant – a 
set of components, is defined: ABCDE, ABGKLDE, AB-
GHLDE. Let data characterizing every part of route for 
each of the variants are gathered from drone-informant, 
processed and prepared for modeling - frequencies of the 
occurrences of potential threats are: for ABCDEF = 1 time 
at 10 hours, ABGKLDEF = 1.5 times at 10 hours, ABGH-
LDE = 2 times at 10 hours (since 08.00 a.m. to 18.00 a.m. 
what is connected with drone capabilities); mean activa-
tion time of threats = 30 minutes; time between the end of 
diagnostics and the beginning of the next diagnostics = 2 
minutes; diagnostics time = 30 seconds;  recovery time = 
10 minutes; given prognostic period =2 hours.  
i=1.  
Step 2 (i=1). Using probabilistic model, a calculation of 
the probability of “failure”  is carried out for each variant. 
From the set of variants ABCDE, ABGKLDE, ABGHL-
DE the shorter variant ABCDE for which risk is equal to 
0.034 is chosen (for the route ABGKLDEF risk=0.051, for 
route ABGHLDEF risk=0.067). The relevant data from 
the drone about the local fire conditions and the weather 
on the part BCDE to 8.00 a.m. are taken into account.  
Step 3 (i=1). The robot overcomes the part AB of route. 
For the new initial point B the input for modeling every 
part of possible route are updated in real time for routes 
BCDE, BGKLDE, BGHLDE. 
Step 4 (i=1). The robot hasn’t yet arrived at the intend-
ed point E (i.e. the last part of the route isn’t overcome). 
i= i+1=2.
Step 2 (i=2 for variants BCDE, BGKLDE, BGHLDE). 
Input for modeling isn’t changed. Risks are the same. 
From the route variants BCDE, BGKLDE, BGHLDE the 
shorter one BCDEF (with minimal risk) is chosen.
Step 3 (i=2 for variant BCDE). The robot overcomes 
the part BC. For the new initial point C the input for mod-
eling every part of possible route are updated in real time: 
dense fog in forest thicket on the CD part does not allow 
further movement. And additional information for robot 
is: the local weather improvements in the next 2 hours are 
not expected. Part CD is impassable. The comeback to the 
initial point B of the part is being.
Step 2 (i=2 for two remaining variants). From variants 
BGKLDE, BGHLDE the shorter one BGKLDE (with 
minimal risk 0.051) is chosen. 
Step 3 (i=2 for variant BGKLDE). The robot over-
comes the part BG. For the new initial point G the input 
for modeling every part of possible route are updated in 
real time: according drone from 9.00 a.m. on parts GK 
and KL the imminent fire is detected. The gathered infor-
mation and knowledge are used to clarify the input for 
modeling, namely: the frequency threats in the part GKL 
increases from 1.5 to 2.5 times at 10 hours. Using a prob-
abilistic model for each variant, a recalculation of the risk 
of failure is carried out. Of the variants GKLDE, GHLDE 
the variant GHLDE is chosen (risk is equal to 0.067, for 
the route GKLDE risk equals 0.083).
Step 4. After overcoming the part GHLDE the robot 
arrived at the intended point E of route in given time.
Thus the way ABCBGHLDE is the result of optimi-
zation before and on the route. The robot purpose was 
achieved owing to preventive measures which were de-
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fined by using risk control on the way (with controlled 
probability of “success” more than 0.9).
6.6 What about the Possible Pragmatic Effects 
from Probabilistic Rationale of Actions for AIS? 
Author of this article took part in creation of the Com-
plex of supporting technogenic safety on the systems of 
oil&gas transportation and distribution and have been 
awarded for it by the Award of the Government of the 
Russian Federation in the field of a science and tech-
nics. The AIS is a part of the created peripheral posts are 
equipped additionally by means of Complex to feel vibra-
tion, a fire, the flooding, unauthorized access, hurricane, 
and also intellectual means of the reaction, capable to 
recognize, identify and predict a development of extreme 
situations – see engineering decisions on Figure 17. 
Figure 17. The AIS as a hard-software part to support 
technogenic safety on the objects of oil&gas distribution
The applications of this Complex for 200 objects in 
several regions of Russia during the period 2009-2014 
have already provided economy about 8,5 Billions of 
Roubles. The economy is reached at the expense of effec-
tive implementation of the functions of risks prediction 
and processes optimization [32].   
7. Conclusion
The proposed approach for probabilistic rationale of AIS 
actions includes description of the proposed models, opti-
mization methods for rationale actions, incremental algo-
rithms for solving:     
(1) the problem 1 - to rationale a rational variant for de-
cision-making on the base of monitored  data about events 
and conditions, and
(2) the problem 2 - to rationale a robot actions under 
limitations on admissible risks of “failures”.
The proposed models include models to estimate AIS 
operation quality and risks prediction for system formal-
ized as “Black box”, algorithm to build new probabilistic 
models for complex system. The practical way to data 
forming for probabilistic modeling is described.
A suitability of the approach is demonstrated by exam-
ples about:
(1) a period of successful system operation by AIS ca-
pabilities;
(2) acceptable requirements to solve problem 1 for in-
formation systems operation;
(3) solving inverse problem to estimate the mean re-
sidual time before the next parameters abnormalities for a 
coal company;
(4) solving problem 1 by AIS operating for  providing 
safety of a floating oil and gas platform;
(5) solving problem 2 for a robot route optimization;
(6) the possible pragmatic effects from probabilistic 
rationale of actions for AIS.
The proposed approach means practically a proactive 
commitment to excellence in uncertainty conditions. 
Appendix A. The Models to Estimate AIS Opera-
tion Quality
The probabilistic models for the estimation of informa-
tion systems operation quality are presented by the formu-
las (A.1) – (A.14) in Table A.1.
Table A.1 The probabilistic models for the estimation 
of information systems operation quality (the proof and 
details - see [20-22,24,25,28])
Models. Input Evaluated measures
The model of functions perfor-
mance by a complex system in 
conditions of unreliability of 
its components.
Input:
N(t) - is the probability 
distribution function (PDF) 
of time between neighboring 
failures (TMTBFnk is the mean 
time); W(t) – is the PDF of 
repair time (Trep. is the mean 
time); V(t) – is the PDF of 
given time if this time is 
random value (Treq. is the mean 
time).
Note. The next variants are 
used by the software tools [35-
37]:
N(t), W(t)  are exponentially 
distributed (i.e. enough mean 
times -  TMTBFnk , Trep.), V(t) is 
determined (i.e. Treq. is const).
Probability P rel  of providing reliable 
function performance during given time.
P V t dN dt td N W trel =
∞ ∞ ∞
∫ ∫ ∫
0 0
  
 
  t
(t t- ( ) * ( ) ,) [ ]
(A.1)
* - is the convolution sign.
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Models. Input Evaluated measures
The models complex of calls 
processing for the different 
dispatcher technologies.
Input for M/G/1/∞:
λi – frequency of the i–th type 
calls for processing;
βi – mean processing time of 
the i–th type calls (without 
queue).
Note. The software tools [35-
37] allow to estimate and to 
compare effectiveness of the 
next dispatcher technologies 
for modeling by M/G/1/∞:
- technology 1 for aprior-
ity calls  processing:  in a 
consecutive order for sin-
gle-tasking processing mode; 
in a time-sharing order for 
multitasking processing mode;
- priority technologies of 
consecutive calls processing 
2-5: technology 2 for calls 
processing with relative priori-
ties in the order “first in - first 
out” (FIFO); technology 3 for 
calls processing with absolute 
priorities in the order FIFO; 
technology 4 for batch calls 
processing (with relative pri-
orities and in the order FIFO 
inside a batch)  [7]; technology 
5 is a combination of technol-
ogies 2, 3, 4 [8].
Probability P .itim. false of well-timed 
processing of i-type calls during the 
required term 
P Ttim i req.i. = ≤ =P ,(t full i. )
γ i
2
Т Тreq.i full.i
∞
0
0
∫
∫ t eγ i− −1
t eγ i
t
− −
dt
1 tdt
(A.2)
γ i =
Т Tfull.i full.i
Т
2
full.i
− 2
,
Relative portion of all well-timed 
processed calls – S and relative portion 
of well-timed processed calls of those 
types for which the customer require-
ments are met – C:
С  
S
Ind
=
=
(
i
∑
i
∑
=
I
α ,
=
I
1
1
)
i
λ
∑
λ
=
I
i
1
=
i
P
P
λ



i
tim i
tim i
1 if  α
0 if  α
,  false
.
.
,  true
,
  Ind Ind
i
∑
=
I
1
( ) ( )
=
=
α α
λ i
1 2+
,  
a1=(there is used criterion 1 and
Tfull i ≤ Treq.i);
a2=(there is used criterion 2 and
Ptim i ≥ Preq.i).
Criterion 1 is if there is required
Tfull i ≤ Treq.i to be  i-type calls processed
in time, criterion 2 is if there is required
Ptim i=P(Tfull i ≤ Treq.i) ≥ Padm.i
to be i-type calls processed in time, Padm.i  
- is admissible level for  well-timed 
processing of i-type calls during the 
required term Preq.i
The formulas for mean response time 
Tfull of i-type calls and for 2
nd moment 
Tfull.i2 - see 
[20-22,24,25,28] .
The model of entering into 
system current data concern-
ing new objects of application 
domain.
Input:
qm - the probability that m new 
objects appear in random mo-
ment, intervals between these 
moments are  exponentially 
distributed with parameter l.
 ∑
>
=
0m
m
m zqz )(Φ  -is productive 
(generating) function;
В(t) – is the PDF of time for 
new information revealing 
and preparing, transfer and 
entering into data base.
Note. The next variants are 
used by the software tools [35-
37]: Ф(z)=z; B(t) is exponen-
tially distributed.
Probability Pcomp. that system contains 
information about states of all real 
object and coincides
P comp. = −  −Φ Β exp t dt
  
 
  
l
∞
∫
0
 1 ( )  ,( ) (A.3)
Models. Input Evaluated measures
The model of information 
gathering.
Input:
C(t) is the PDF of time between 
essential changes of object 
states,  xi – is the mean time;
B(t) is the PDF of time for 
information gathering and 
preparing, transfer and entering 
into system;
Q(t) is the PDF of time interval 
between information updating, 
q is the mean time (only for 
mode D2);
the mode D1 of gathering: 
information is gathered in order 
“immediately after an essential 
object state change;
the mode D2 of gathering: 
information is gathered without 
any dependencies on changes of 
objects current states (including 
regulated information gather-
ing).
Note. The next variants are used 
by the software tools [35-37]:
B(t), C(t) are exponentially 
distributed, Q(t) is V(t) is 
determined or exponentially 
distributed.
Probability Pact of information actuality 
on the moment of its use:
(1) for the mode D1 when information is 
gathered in order “immediately after an 
essential object state change:
P act = −
ξ
1
i
∞
∫
0
B(t)[1 C(t)]dt, (A.4)
(2) for the mode D2 when information 
is gathered without any dependencies 
on changes of objects current states 
(including regulated information gather-
ing)
Pact = − − +q
1
i
∞
∫
0
  
 
  
[1 Q(t)][1 C(t τ)dB(τ)] dt,
∞
∫
0
(A.5)
The model of information 
analysis.
Input:
Treq. - assigned term for analy-
sis;
N(t) is the PDF of time be-
tween type I analysis errors, h-1 
is the mean time;
M(t) is the PDF of time be-
tween the neighboring errors 
in checked information; А(t) 
is the PDF of analyzed type II 
errors, TMTBF is the mean time; 
m  is the relative fraction of 
errors in information content 
(destined for problems of 
checking) or the relative frac-
tion of information essential 
for analysis (destined for 
problems of analysis);
Treal= V/n - is the real time for 
complete information analysis;
V – is a content of analyzed 
information;
n - is an analyzed speed;
Tcont. - is time of continuous 
analyst’s work.
Note. The next variants are 
used by the software tools [35-
37]:
Treq. - is an assigned term 
(deadline) for analysis; V, n, 
Tcont. and Treq. are assigned as 
deterministic values;
N(t)=1–exp(-t×η);
M(t) =1 –exp(-t×μ×ν);
А(t)= 1–exp(-t/ TMTBF).
Probability Pafter of errors absence after 
checking (probability Pafter of correct analysis 
results obtaining):
Variant 1. An assigned term for analysis is no 
less than the real analysis time (Treal≤Treq.) and 
the content of analyzed information is such 
small that it is required only one continuous 
analyst’s work period (Treal ≤ Tcont.).
= − ⋅
  
 
  
P
V
  
∫ ∫
0 /
/
after
n
1 ( / )
dA M V dA t
(1)
N V
( )[1 ( / )] ( )
ˆ
( , , , , , , )
t n t
V nm n
− − +
n
T T TMTBF cont req. .
V
∞
n
=
(A.6)
Variant 2. An assigned term for analysis is 
no less than the real analysis time (i.e. Treal ≤ 
Treq.). But the content of analyzed informa-
tion is comparatively large, i.e. Treal>Tcont..
Рafter(2) = {Рafter(1) (Vpart(2) , m, n, h, ТMTBF, Тcont., 
tpart(2))}
N,   (A.7)
N=V/(n Тcont.), Vpart(2)=V/N, tpart(2) = Тreq./N.
Variant 3. An assigned term for analysis is 
less than the real analysis time (Treal>Treq.) and 
the content of analyzed information is such 
small that it is required only one continuous 
analyst’s work period (Treal ≤ Tcont.).
Рafter(3) = (Vpart(3)/V)× Рafter(1) (Vpart(3) , m, n, h, 
ТMTBF, Тcont., Тreq.)+
+[(V-Vpart(3))/V]× Рwithout,(A.8)
where Vpart(3) =nТreq.. , Рwithout = e 
-m (V-V part(3) ).
Variant 4. An assigned term for analysis is no 
less than the real analysis time (i.e. Treal>Treq.), 
but the content of analyzed information is 
comparatively large, i.e. Treal>Tcont..
Р after =

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(A.9)
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Models. Input Evaluated measures
The models complex of an autho-
rized access to system  resources 
during objective period.
Input (for estimation  of confi-
dentiality):
М  is the conditional number of a 
barriers against an unauthorized 
access;
Fm(t) is the PDF of time between 
changes of the m-th barrier 
parameters;
Um(t) is the PDF of parameters 
decoding time of the m-th  secu-
rity system barrier, um – the mean 
time of a barrier overcoming;
H(t) – is the PDF of objective 
period, when resources value is 
high.
Note. The next variants are used 
by the software tools [35-37]:
Um(t)is exponentially distributed;
Fm(t) and H(t) are determined or 
exponentially distributed.
Probability Pvalue of system protection 
against unauthorized access during 
objective period
,.∏−=
=
M
1m
movervalue P1P (A.10)
where Pover m – is the risk of overcom-
ing the m-th barrier by violator during 
objective period when resources value 
is high,
P F Hover = −f
1
m
∞ ∞
0 0
∫ ∫ ∫dt d ( ) d ( ) ( )
t
m t θ θ
t
U m [1 ,]
The models complex of danger-
ous influences on a protected 
system.
Input:
Ωpenetr(t) – is the PDF of time be-
tween neighboring influences for 
penetrating a danger source, for 
Ωpenetr.(t)=1-e
-st, s - is the frequen-
cy of influences for penetrating;
Ωactiv(t) – is the PDF of activa-
tion time of a penetrated danger 
source, for Ωactiv(t)=1-e
-t/b, b – is 
the mean activation time;
Treq – is the required period of 
permanent secure system opera-
tion;
Tbetw. – is the time between the 
end of diagnostic and the begin-
ning of the next diagnostic, Tdiag 
– is the diagnostic time.
Note. The next variants are used 
by the software tools [35-37]:
Ωpenetr(t) and Um(t) are exponen-
tially distributed.
Probability Pinfl of faultless (correct) 
operation during given time:
variant 1 – the assigned period Treq is less 
than established period between neigh-
boring diagnostics (Treq < Tbetw.+Tdiag)
Pinfl.(1)(Treq) = 1 - Ωpenetr* Ωactiv(Treq), 
(A.11)
variant 2 – the assigned period Treq is 
more than or equals to established period 
between neighboring diagnostics (Treq ≥ 
Tbetw.+Tdiag):
+ +
P Т Tinf .(2) . .
T Т Treq betw diag
l betw diag
. . .− +
= ⋅ + +
N
N
(
T
(Т T
req
betw diag
.
T
. .
req
+
.
)
)
P Т Tinf . . .
P
l betw diag
inf .(1)
(
l
N (
) ,
)
(A.12)
where N=[ Тreq./(Тbetw.+ Тdiag.)] – is the 
integer part.
The models complex of an 
authorized access to system  
resources.
Input (for estimation  of confi-
dentiality):
М  is the conditional number 
of a barriers against an 
unauthorized access;
Fm(t) is the PDF of time between 
changes of the m-th barrier 
parameters;
Um(t) is the PDF of parame-
ters decoding time of the m-th  
security system barrier, um – the 
mean time of a barrier overcom-
ing.
Note. The next variants are used 
by the software tools [35-37]:
Um(t)is exponentially distribut-
ed;
Fm(t) is determined or exponen-
tially distributed.
Probability Pprot of system protection 
against unauthorized access:
,∏−=
=
M
1m
moverprot P1P (A.13)
where Pover m – is the probability of over-
coming the m-th barrier by violator,
P Fover m = −f
1
m
∞
0
∫ [1 ( )] ( ) .m t t dtU m (A.14)
Note: The final clear analytical formulas are received by Lebesque-inte-
gration of (A.1). (A.3) – (A.6), (A.10), (A.14).
Appendix B. The Models to Predict Risks for 
“Black box” 
The proposed models allow to estimate preventive risks 
for being control in real time. The approach for modeling 
is based on algorithmic building new probabilistic models 
– see Table B.1.
The probabilistic models for the estimation of preven-
tive risks for being control in real time is presented by the 
formulas (B.1) – (B.6) in Table B.1.
Table B.1 – The models to predict risks for “Black box” 
(the proof and details - see [24, 25, 28, 30, 44-45])
Models, methods Evaluated measures Formulas
The model for technolo-
gy 1  (“Black box”).
Note. Technology 1 
(without monitoring 
between diagnostics) 
is based on periodical 
diagnostics of system 
integrity, that are carried 
out to detect danger 
sources penetration into 
a system or conse-
quences of negative 
influences. The lost 
system integrity can be 
detect only as a result 
of diagnostics, after 
which system recovery 
is started.  Dangerous 
influence on system is 
acted step-by step: at 
first a danger source 
penetrates into a system 
and then after its activa-
tion begins to influence. 
System integrity can’t 
be lost before a pene-
trated danger source is 
activated. A danger is 
considered to be real-
ized only after a danger 
source has influenced 
on a system.
Input:
Ωpenetr(t) – is the PDF of 
time between neigh-
boring influences for 
penetrating a danger 
source;
Ωactiv(t) – is the PDF of 
activation time of a pen-
etrated danger source;
Tbetw. – is the time be-
tween the end of diag-
nostic and the beginning 
of the next diagnostic,
Tdiag – is the diagnostic 
time.
Risk 
to lose 
system 
integrity 
(R).
Proba-
bility of 
providing 
system 
integrity 
(P)
R=1-P considering consequences.
Variant 1 – the given prognostic 
period Treq is less than established 
period between neighboring diag-
nostics
(Treq < Tbetw.+Tdiag):
P(1) (Treq) = 1 - Ωpenetr* Ωactiv(Treq). 
(B.1)
Variant 2 – the assigned period Treq 
is more than or equals to estab-
lished period between neighboring 
diagnostics
(Treq ≥ Tbetw.+Tdiag):
measure a)
P(2) (Treq) = N((Tbetw +Tdiag)/Treq) P(1)
N(Tbetw +Tdiag) + (Trmn/Treq) P(1)(Trmn),
(B.2)
where N=[Tgiven/(Тbetw.+Тdiag.)] is the 
integer part,  Trmn = Tgiven -N(Tbetw 
+Tdiag);
measure b)
P(2) (Treq) = P(1)
N(Tbetw +Tdiag) P(1)
(Trmn),
(B.3),
where  the probability of success 
within the given time P(1)(Treq) is 
defined by (B.1).
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Models, methods Evaluated measures Formulas
The model for technolo-
gy 2 (“Black box”).
Note. Technology 2, 
unlike the previous one, 
implies that operators 
alternating each other 
trace system integrity 
between diagnostics 
(operator may be a 
man or special device 
or their combination). 
In case of detecting a 
danger source an op-
erator recovers system 
integrity. The ways of 
integrity recovering are 
analogous to the ways 
of technology 1.  Fault-
less operator’s actions 
provide a neutralization 
of a danger source try-
ing to penetrate into a 
system. When operators 
alternate a complex 
diagnostic is held. A 
penetration of a danger 
source is possible only 
if an operator makes an 
error but a dangerous 
influence occurs if the 
danger is activated be-
fore the next diagnostic. 
Otherwise the source 
will be detected and 
neutralized during the 
next diagnostic.
Input:
Additionally to Input 
for technology 1:
A(t) - is the PDF of 
time from the last finish 
of diagnostic time up to 
the first operator error
Risk 
to lose 
system 
integrity 
(R).
Proba-
bility of 
providing 
system 
integrity 
(P)
R=1-P considering consequences.
Variant 1 - (Treq < Tbetw.+Tdiag):
P T(1)( ) 1 ( ) ( ).req penetr act= − *
T T
∫ ∫
0
req req
dA dt θ
t
Ω Ω (B.4)
Variant 2 – (Treq ≥ Tbetw.+Tdiag):
measure a)
P(2) (Treq) = N((Tbetw +Tdiag)/Treq) P(1)
N(Tbetw +Tdiag) + (Trmn/Treq) P(1)(Trmn),
(B.5)
measure b)
P(2) (Treq) = P(1)
N(Tbetw +Tdiag) P(1)
(Trmn),(B.6),
where N is the same and the prob-
ability of success within the given 
time P(1)(Treq) is defined by (B.4)
Note: The final clear analytical formula (B.4) is received by its Leb-
esque-integration
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